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Abstract 
Objectives. To evaluate the impact of junk food marketing policies implemented worldwide from 2003 
through 2014 on nationwide junk food sales and to identify the most effective policy characteristics in 
reducing junk food sales.  
Methods. Junk food marketing policy data were obtained and categorized through a thorough literature 
review. These data were analyzed using a repeated measures design against EuroMonitor junk food sales 
data from 2002 and 2016.  
Results. Countries with junk food marketing policies saw a decrease in junk food sales after 
implementation, while those without said policies saw an increase in sales. Countries with statutory 
policies saw a decrease in junk food sales, while those with only self-regulation saw an increase. 
Comprehensive audience restrictions, standardized nutrition criteria and mandated messaging were policy 
characteristics significantly associated with a decrease in junk food sales. 
Conclusion. This study utilizes a novel approach to evaluate the effectiveness of junk food marketing 
policies by measuring changes in country-level junk food sales. Countries with statutory junk food 
marketing policies have demonstrated a significant decrease in junk food sales that is not seen in countries 
with only self-regulatory policies. This is consistent with previous studies that have found statutory 
policies to be successful in reducing children’s exposure to junk food advertisements, while self-
regulatory efforts have little to no impact. In order to effectively reduce the exposure and impact of child-
targeted junk food marketing, governments should establish strong and comprehensive statutory 
regulations.   
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Introduction 
Today we have reached a point where illnesses from nutrient-rich diets outweigh the global burden of 
hunger. These diet-related chronic illnesses, such as heart disease, obesity and diabetes, pose an even 
greater burden on health than “sex, drugs, alcohol and tobacco combined” [1]. In many countries, such as 
the United States, overweight has become the new norm. 
While medical advances in developed nations have been able to significantly reduce deaths from 
diet-related illnesses each year [4], the prevalence of these diseases continues to rise and encroach into the 
lives of our youth. Worldwide, 42 million children and infants under five are overweight or obese, an 
increase of over 10 million since 1990.  
It is known that the overconsumption of unhealthy foods is a major contributing factor to 
cardiovascular disease, obesity and diabetes [5]. It is also understood that dietary interventions can 
prevent and often reverse these diseases [6]. However, in spite of this knowledge, alongside the eruption 
of a massive epidemic of diet-related illnesses in our adults and youth, food corporations continue to 
aggressively market their junk food to children [7, 8]. Research shows that although parents are perceived 
as the primary decision makers, child preferences are the major influencing factor behind snack purchases 
and meal preparation [9]. Additionally, studies consistently find that exposure to food advertisements is 
linked to increased consumption patterns and obesity in children [10, 11, 12].  
Junk food marketing policies have been implemented worldwide in the form of government 
statutes and self-regulatory codes. While self-regulation has been largely ineffective in reducing even the 
number of unhealthy food advertisements [8], government legislation has been successful in reducing 
child exposure to marketing, mirrored by a fall in advertising budgets [13].  
The aim of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of junk food broadcast marketing policies by 
measuring changes in country-level junk food sales. We hypothesized that countries with junk food 
broadcast marketing policies would experience a decrease in junk food sales on average after 
implementation, while countries without said policies would not. Secondarily, we hypothesized that 
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countries with statutory policies and stricter policies would experience a decrease in junk food sales after 
implementation, while countries with only self-regulation or less strict policies would not.  
Background 
Prevalence of overweight and obesity worldwide 
The prevalence of obesity worldwide has more than doubled in the past four decades. In 1975, less than 
five percent of the world population was obese and 22% overweight; in 2014, the number of obese 
persons rose to 13% and 39% overweight [14]. Overweight and obesity are major risk factors for diet-
related illnesses such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes and cancer [15]. Children who are obese are at a 
higher risk of being obese in adulthood, and often express metabolic risk factors at a young age. In a 
study of Brazilian schoolchildren, 39% of obese children had high blood pressure, compared to just nine 
percent of healthy weight children [15].   
The prevalence of child overweight and obesity has increased rapidly over the past four decades 
[16]. In the United States, the number of overweight and obese children has more than doubled since 
1972. Today, one in three American children are overweight. In countries such as Mexico, the prevalence 
has quadrupled. While obesity has traditionally been a disease of the Western world, emerging nations 
harbor the majority of overweight and obese children, and are burdened with more than 30% higher 
incidence rates [17]. Unfortunately, while the prevalence of overweight and obesity for children under 
five has been widely surveyed, less is known about the overweight and obesity status for youth over five 
[16].  
Lobstein et al. observed that in conjunction with the rise in childhood overweight and obesity, 
children are undergoing a parallel decline in height [16]. The populations of stunted and overweight 
children appear to overlap. In Vietnam, five percent of overweight children were stunted, and in Brazil it 
was observed that childhood obesity was more commonly associated with stunting than not. This 
indicates that while children are consuming more calories overall, their nutritional status may in fact be 
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declining. The increasing prevalence in stunting may be interfering with overweight and obesity 
measurements, which are commonly determined through BMI. Thus policymakers must be wary of 
overweight and obesity interventions that may increase the risk of undernourishment. 
 
Food culture 
In recent decades, food culture has increasingly gravitated towards convenience foods and snacking habits 
[9]. Convenience and snack foods are a relatively new phenomenon, supported by the increasing trend for 
working mothers and time-strapped parents. Unfortunately these foods are more likely to be high in fat, 
salt and sugar (HFSS), and less likely to be eaten with fruits and vegetables. In the United Kingdom, 
while parents and children alike appear to be still aware that they should eat more fruits and vegetables 
and less HFSS foods, children prefer the taste of HFSS products and parents more often defer to child 
preferences [9]. At the same time, schools often serve HFSS products for meals, such as hot dogs, pizza 
and chips, and rely on vending machines selling sodas and HFSS snacks for income [9].  
 
Junk foods 
The term “junk food,” or unhealthy food, has a range of definitions sculpted by diet fads, scientific 
findings and regulatory efforts. Nutrition criteria for the purpose of advertising regulation typically 
categorize the healthfulness of foods based on nutrient components. For example, the United Kingdom 
Nutrient Profiling Model uses a system that scores food based on its calorie, sugar, salt and fat content to 
determine if a food is fit for advertising [18]. The European Union Pledge sets nutrition limits specific to 
food type [19] and Chile sets strict limits for nutrient components regardless of food type [20] to 
determine if a food is healthy. 
Perhaps more important than defining what is junk is defining what is healthy. One study 
revealed that 84% of children’s foods labelled as ‘healthy’ by the American Heart Association’s heart-
healthy symbol did not meet basic nutritional standards [21]. Often children’s foods are less healthy than 
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teen and adult alternatives. Schwartz et al. found that 66% of cereals marketed to American children did 
not meet basic nutritional standards and were higher in calories, sugar and sodium when compared to 
adult cereals [22]. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) similarly found that foods marketed to children 
are higher in calories and sodium compared to teen products [23].  However, children’s products were 
lower in sugar and higher in fiber, whole grain, calcium and vitamin D. The FTC speculates this is 
partially because soda and candy are advertised more so to teens than children. 
Following the implementation of the United States Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising 
Initiative (CFBAI) in 2006, corporations reformulated many youth-directed products to both increase 
valued nutrients such as fiber, whole grain, and calcium, and to decrease nutrients like calories, saturated 
fat, sodium, and sugar [23]. Yet, corporate efforts to reformulate were not mirrored by changes in 
marketing tactics. In 2009, cereals using attractive marketing techniques such as licensed characters or 
other cross-promotions (i.e., toys, movies, video games) had less than half the whole grain of children’s 
cereals marketed without these techniques. Additionally, reformulation has made small progress in nearly 
all food categories surveyed by the FTC. No youth-directed snacks met the United States Food and Drug 
Administration’s standard for “low calorie” and just three percent of child-directed cereals met the 
standard for claiming “low sodium.” Strangely, while children’s prepared foods decreased in sodium, 
sugar was increased by 50% and calories by 16%.  
The largest strides for reformulation have been made for youth in-school drink marketing, dairy 
marketing, and quick-service restaurants [23]. All advertised quick-service children’s meals met the 
United States Food and Drug Administration standard for “low calorie” and “low sodium,” and 64% met 
the standard for “low saturated fat” in 2009. Additionally, quick-service children’s meals marketed with 
licensed characters and other cross-promotions were more nutritious than meals advertised without cross-
promotions. 
Overall, the lines between what is healthy and what is junk are difficult to define. Regulators have 
tended to judge foods based on nutrient components rather than the type of food (i.e., fruits and 
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vegetables versus confectionary). Such guidelines give the opportunity for corporations to reformulate 
existing products to meet advertising criteria rather than investing in more naturally nutritious foods. 
 
Junk food corporations are targeting children  
In 2012, the total advertising spending for healthier foods in the United States, including milk ($169 
million), bottled water ($81 million), vegetables ($72 million), and fruit ($45 million), was still less than 
one-twelfth of fast food restaurant advertising alone, which totaled a booming $4.6 billion [24]. There is 
reason to believe the massive bombardment of junk food marketing is contributing significantly to the 
overconsumption of junk foods, and thus the epidemic of diet-related illnesses. 
Much of this advertising is targeted towards children. In 2009, the FTC identified that nearly $1.8 
billion (18.5% of all food marketing expenditures) were spent on marketing food and beverages to 
children in the United States [23]. These dollars have not been going to waste. The Rudd Center found 
that the average American child watches nearly 4,700 food-related ads per year, with 84% of these ads 
marketing junk food [25].  
 
Advertising to children impacts diet and family purchases 
Industry groups argue that parents are primarily responsible for their children’s diets [58], but research 
would suggest otherwise. In grocery store observations by O’Dougherty, Story and Stang [26], 52% of 
the time food was considered for purchase by families, it involved a child’s request, over half of which 
were for sweets and snacks. Similarly, a UK-wide survey by Ofcom found that even when parents were 
paying, snacks were more often chosen by children [9]. When compared to non-HFSS foods, children 
were more likely to cite marketing techniques, such as packaging, promotional offers, and TV advertising, 
as reasons for purchasing HFSS products. When the choice was left solely to the parents, whether a child 
liked a food was cited as the primary reason for meal choices. Unlike in children, advertising was far less 
likely to influence parental food purchases.  
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Advertising acts by directly impacting children’s food choices, but is also theorized to act 
indirectly by altering peer norms and parental expectations, which in turn impact child and family 
preferences and purchases [9]. Research has shown that TV advertising can normalize unhealthy diets, 
encourage pestering of parents to purchase particular foods, and prime consumers to be further influenced 
by in-store promotions.   
For the purpose of advertising, kids are easy targets. Due to their stage of development, children 
are more vulnerable to marketing tactics as they may not yet be able to comprehend the intent of 
advertisements [27]. Junk food corporations are exploiting this vulnerability to effectively alter the food 
children like, the food they eat and the food they buy [28]. Indeed, based on an accumulation of academic 
research on the effects of TV advertising, Livingstone of Ofcom concluded that there is a “tacit 
consensus” that TV advertising has “modest direct effects” on child food preferences [9]. Even the 
appearance of media characters on packaging alters a child’s perception on how a food tastes [29]. The 
implications of these findings are large. American children influence $200 billion of parent spending each 
year [30] and the Institute of Medicine estimated the total purchase influence for children at $500 billion 
[28].  
 
Child-targeted advertising is linked to childhood obesity  
Research has shown that junk food marketing to youth may be linked to increased caloric intake and 
childhood obesity. McClure et al. found a direct relationship between receptivity to TV fast-food 
advertising and obesity in 15-23 year olds, independent of sedentary time [10]. Receptivity was calculated 
as the sum of whether a child had seen an ad, liked an ad and recognized the brand of the digitally 
unbranded ad. Using a general behavioral questionnaire, Bruce et al. found that obese children were 
significantly more impulsive than healthy weight children [11]. Additionally, on MRI imaging these 
obese children indicated greater activation in the reward regions of the midbrain when shown food logos, 
while healthy weight children had greater activation in regions associated with self-control. These studies 
suggest children who are obese may be more likely to act in response to food advertisements. 
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Unfortunately, both of these studies do not demonstrate whether these differences are present before or 
after a child becomes obese.  
Halford et al. found that both healthy weight and obese children consumed significantly more 
calories (14-17%) after viewing a food advertisement compared to a non-food advertisement [12]. Body 
weight did not have an effect on consumption, which the previously mentioned studies failed to account 
for. Interestingly, study foods consumed by the children were not associated with any brand advertised, 
therefore suggesting that food advertisements increase immediate consumption regardless of brand. 
An ecological study demonstrated a positive and highly significant relationship between the 
prevalence rates of overweight children in various countries and the number of sweet/fatty food 
advertisements [31]. While healthier food advertisements composed from zero to six percent of all 
advertisements in a country (in contrast, food advertising accounted for 38-84% of all advertising), 
healthier ads were negatively correlated to the prevalence of overweight children (p < 0.10). Ofcom also 
found a dose-dependent association between the number of hours United Kingdom children watched TV 
and overall consumption of HFSS products [9]. In this type of landscape, any advocacy by parents, health 
professionals and educators for healthy foods is being drowned out by the advertising budgets of junk 
food corporations.  
 
Regulatory action is hindered by corporate backlash  
In 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) called on Member States and the private sector to 
address the influence of food marketing on dietary choices [32]. This was later followed by the more 
specific 2010 WHO resolution WHA63.14, which urged countries to regulate food and beverage 
marketing for products high in saturated fats, trans-fatty acids, sugars and/or salt to children [33]. That 
same year, the resolution was endorsed by 192 member states. However, in 2016, Kraak reported that 
many member states had relied on industry self-regulation, and no member state or company had 
implemented comprehensive restrictions on junk food marketing [33]. 
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The lack of strong junk food marketing regulations, despite WHO recommendations, may be 
attributed to corporate push-back. In 2011, the Obama administration called on food manufacturers to 
adopt voluntary marketing restrictions of unhealthy foods to children [34, 35]. The food industry, under 
guise of the Sensible Food Policy Coalition, responded with claims that such restrictions would have no 
impact on the obesity crisis and unjustifiably restrict the industry’s right to free speech, though the 
restrictions were unenforceable by nature [35]. The proposal was subsequently delayed.  
When San Francisco moved to require health warning labels on advertisements for sugary 
beverages and ban their advertising on city property, the city was sued by the American Beverage 
Association. The corporate alliance claimed that the city was in violation of the First Amendment [36]. 
Resistance can also be seen in industry advertising codes such as the Spanish PAOS (Publicidad, 
Actividad, Obesidad y Salud) Code, which tried to shift the blame of the obesity epidemic on sedentary 
lifestyles. The industry group went on to say “it serves no purpose to place the burden of responsibility” 
on industry nor the foods advertised [37]. Most notably, since the 1960s public opinion had blamed fat for 
the rise in heart disease; it wasn’t until 2016 that internal documents revealed how the sugar industry paid 
scientists to promote fat as the culprit, effectively directing consumers to eat low-fat foods while denying 
sugar’s role in heart disease [38]. Recently the corporate-sponsored International Life Sciences Institute 
funded a 2017 review claiming that “no clear link exists between added sugar intake and health 
outcomes” [39]. 
While shocking, the corporate backlash against regulatory advances and manipulation of 
scientific research parallel the playbook used by the tobacco industry, which had purposely and 
successfully denied the link between smoking and lung cancer since the 1950s [40]. While reminding us 
of the all too familiar industry tactics to dissuade regulatory action, now used by food corporations today, 
Brownell and Warner plead us to not let history repeat itself again.  
In this context, it is important to underline that any industry commitment to restrict junk food 
marketing is likely to be ineffective at best until governments demand stronger regulation.  
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Self-regulatory efforts  
Self-regulatory efforts have mainly taken two forms: those regulated by established self-regulatory 
organizations or industry pledges. Both forms are run by industry groups and have little to no government 
oversight. Today, the majority of industry pledges that address food and beverage marketing to children 
come from the International Food and Beverage Alliance (IFBA). IFBA pledges were first instituted in 
2006, and have since been established as national, regional and now global pledges [41]. Prior to IFBA’s 
global pledge, effective in 2017, the mishmash of pledges covered 51 countries, including countries under 
the European Union.   
The inherent problem with industry-led initiatives to restrict junk food advertising is that such 
restrictions are directly detrimental to their bottom line. As a result, these self-defined regulations and 
nutritional standards are typically less restrictive than government regulation, and largely ineffective. For 
instance, while the CFBAI was followed by an inflation-adjusted reduction of 19.5% of the United States 
food marketing budget directed to youth by 2009, the FTC found that children are seeing more food 
advertisements now than ever [10]. The Rudd Center found that between 2009 and 2012, three years after 
the formation of CFBAI, 60% of fast food restaurants had actually increased television advertising, 
including McDonald’s, Domino’s and Wendy’s [24]. The decrease in advertising budgets may be 
explained by the increased utilization of websites, mobile devices and social media to capture the 
attention of children and teens – cheaper mediums with higher impact. Additionally, the potential 
effectiveness of the initiative is highly questionable. For instance, CFBAI’s corporate-defined nutrition 
criteria determined that Popsicles, Reese’s Puffs and Fruit Gushers were products fit for children’s health 
[42]. 
Due to the clear conflict of interest and disappointing results of corporate-led initiatives, it is no 
surprise that statutory actions are the preferred method to restrict and/or ban junk food marketing [43, 44]. 
Statutory action in South Korea resulted in nearly total compliance one month after the legislation came 
into effect [13]. In 2010, South Korea restricted TV advertising of energy dense, nutrient poor (EDNP) 
“children preferred foods”, which includes foods such as confectionary, candies and baked goods, from 
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7pm to 9pm each day and during children’s programs at any time. Across five TV channels, Kim et al. 
found only six EDNP ads in October 2010 between 7pm to 9pm compared to 295 ads in October 2009. 
The researchers found advertisements also decreased significantly during non-regulated hours, overall 
seeing a 58% reduction in EDNP ads for regulated and non-regulated hours. Strikingly, advertising 
budgets plummeted by 31% for all hours and by 77% for regulated hours.  
Statutory action in the United Kingdom also resulted in nearly “universal adherence” six months 
after implementation of restrictions on HFSS advertising in children’s channels and around programs of 
interest to children [45]. However, despite high compliance, the authors noted that overall child exposure 
to unhealthy foods had not changed due to the range of television shows children engage with outside of 
child-dedicated programs and channels.  
It must also be noted that even if statutory restrictions are effective, the majority of such statutes 
arise from highly developed countries. Thus, as transnational junk food corporations are pushed out of 
wealthy states, they will increasingly target the consumers of emerging nations [46]. This underlines the 
importance of global cooperation and transnational marketing codes.  
 
Measurement of policy effectiveness 
In 2010, the WHO devised a set of recommendations for the formation of policies that reduce the impact, 
power and exposure of food marketing to children [43]. The WHO recommends the use of a government-
led, comprehensive approach that clearly defines the audience, communication channels, settings, 
techniques and foods that may be allowed or restricted. Countries should cooperate to reduce exposure to 
non-compliant cross-border marketing, and should implement enforcement, monitoring and evaluation 
measures to enhance policy compliance and effectiveness. 
The WHO highlighted the importance of evaluating effectiveness through a policy’s ability to 
reduce the impact of junk food marketing [43]. Impact can be studied by measuring changes in HFSS 
product sales and consumption patterns in response to policy. The present study provides an opportunity 
to measure these changes by utilizing food sales data for countries that implemented food marketing 
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policies, and to correlate these changes to the stringency and characteristics of relevant policies. In doing 
so, we attempt to assess the effectiveness of junk food broadcast marketing policies worldwide.  
 
Methods and Materials  
The present study will explore the following hypotheses:  
H1: Countries that enacted policies regulating junk food broadcast marketing will experience a decrease 
in junk food sales after implementation. 
H2: Countries that enacted policies regulating junk food broadcast marketing will experience a greater 
decrease in junk food sales after implementation compared to countries that did not. 
H3: Countries that enacted statutory policies regulating junk food broadcast marketing will experience a 
greater decrease in junk food sales after implementation compared to countries with self-regulatory 
policies. 
H4: Countries with stricter policies regulating junk food broadcast marketing will experience a greater 
decrease in junk food sales after implementation compared to countries with less strict policies. 
 
Study Design 
This study used EuroMonitor data on junk food sales to identify countries that were then evaluated in a 
thorough literature review for the evidence of junk food broadcast marketing policies implemented 
between 2003 and through 2014. Various sources were used to identify and characterize policies, 
including WHO-Europe and the World Cancer Research Fund International. A series of repeated-
measures ANOVA analyses was used to evaluate EuroMonitor food sales data pre- and post-policy 
implementation.  
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EuroMonitor Data 
Retail/off-trade and foodservice volume sales data were obtained through the EuroMonitor International 
(EuroMonitor) Passport Global Market Information Database [47]. This information was collected by 
EuroMonitor analysts who identified data on food sales through a variety of official government statistics, 
trade associations, trade press, company and other sources. EuroMonitor defines retail/off-trade product 
volume as the volume of product sold to consumers through retail channels. These products are sold 
primarily for household use, with retailers including grocery stores, convenience stores, and outdoor 
markets, among others. Foodservice sales serve the public in non-captive environments including 
restaurants, cafés, delivery, cafeterias and street vendors. Captive foodservice units, including hospitals, 
schools and prisons, are not included. Data are available from 2002-2016, as well as forecast data up to 
2021. EuroMonitor data have been used in various health-related food sales analyses [48, 49, 50]. For 
instance, Baker and Friel used EuroMonitor data on per capita sales volumes of packaged food products 
through retail and food service channels to estimate the trend in country-level sugar, fat and salt 
consumption across Asia [48]. 
For this project, EuroMonitor data were collected in the form of kg per capita country-level sales 
of select, packaged food categories. Packaged food categories were selected based on their relevance to 
HFSS products, as defined by the Committees of Advertising Practice (CAP) of the United Kingdom as 
foods or beverages high in fat, salt or sugar [51]. 
In Baker and Friel’s [48] analysis of processed foods consumption in Asia using EuroMonitor 
data, baked goods, biscuits, carbonated soft drinks, confectionary, ready meals and sweet and savory 
snacks ranked as the top five contributors for salt, fat and/or sugar consumption. Of note, baked goods 
ranked as a top contributor in sugar, fat and salt consumption for all country income brackets. Other top 
contributors included dairy and ice cream; however, EuroMonitor data for these categories were not 
available. The FTC identified that in 2006, 72% of United States youth-directed food marketing 
expenditures were for quick-service restaurants, carbonated beverages and breakfast cereals [23]. WHO-
Europe also identified that the food categories most heavily advertised were soft drinks, sweetened 
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breakfast cereals, biscuits, confectionary, snack foods, ready meals and quick-service restaurants [52]. For 
the above reasons, baked goods, breakfast cereals, confectionary, ready meals, savory snacks, and sweet 
biscuits, snack bars and fruit snacks for both retail/off-trade and foodservice sales were selected for this 
analysis (Table 1). Packaged food categories, which are mutually exclusive, were summed into a value for 
total junk food consumption.  
 
Table 1. Descriptions of Selected EuroMonitor Packaged Food Categories [47]. 
 
Packaged Food Category 
 
Description 
Baked Goods (BG) Bread, pastries, dessert mixes, frozen baked goods and cakes; in-store bakery products are 
classified as unpackaged, and thus not included here 
Breakfast Cereals (BC) Ready-to-eat and hot cereals 
Confectionary (CO) Chocolate confectionery, sugar confectionery and gum 
Ready Meals (RM) Defined as meals requiring no or few outside ingredients; includes shelf stable, frozen, dried, 
chilled ready meals, dinner mixes, frozen pizza, chilled pizza and prepared salads 
Savory Snacks (SS) Fruit snacks, chips/crisps, extruded snacks, tortilla/corn chips, popcorn, pretzels, nuts and other 
sweet and savory snacks 
Sweet Biscuits, Snack Bars 
and Fruit Snacks (SB) 
Biscuits, snack bars and fruit snacks 
Total (TF) Sum of baked goods, breakfast cereals, confectionary, ready meals, savory snacks, and sweet 
biscuits, snack bars and fruit snacks. Carbonates were excluded.  
 
Carbonates were excluded due to their uniqueness in driving policy formation. Specifically, many 
transnational soft drink corporations have already committed to stop advertising for all beverages to 
children on either a nationwide, regional and/or company-wide basis. For example, the Union of 
European Beverages Associations (UNESDA) committed to stop advertising to children under 12 in 
countries of the European Union beginning in 2006. UNESDA company members include PepsiCo, 
Coca-Cola and Red Bull, among others [53]. While these policies appear to be more comprehensive 
compared to other industry pledges, the FTC revealed in 2009 that 97% of youth-directed marketing for 
soft drink expenditures in the United States were directed towards teenagers, while only 3% were directed 
towards children under 12 [23]. Thus, a comprehensive marketing restriction does not affect the majority 
of their youth targets. This is in contrast to United States food marketing expenditures in general, for 
which $1 billion was spent on children and $1 billion on teens. Often children are more heavily targeted 
than teens for foods like breakfast cereals where $173 million of $186 million of youth-directed 
marketing expenditures were directed towards children, and $103 million towards teens (including 
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overlap). Therefore, sales of such foods are more likely to fluctuate in the presence of junk food 
marketing policies, which primarily focus on children.  
EuroMonitor provided data on per capita retail/off-trade and foodservice volume sales of 
packaged foods for 80 countries. Taiwan was excluded due to lack of Human Development Index data, 
which was used later as a covariate. This left a sample size of 79 EuroMonitor countries for which policy 
status was evaluated.  
To identify countries with junk food broadcast marketing policies, a country had to have, at the 
minimum, a policy that satisfied the following inclusion criteria:  
1. Addresses junk foods specifically OR affects junk food marketing in a significant way 
2. Applies to television marketing 
3. Applies to the country nationwide 
4. Implemented on January 1, 2003 or later, and before December 31, 2014 
Inclusion Criteria 1. Due to the variety of policy definitions, policies addressing junk foods were 
defined broadly. Policies were identified as addressing junk foods if they restricted or provided ethical 
guidelines on marketing for unhealthy foodstuffs, foods high in fat, salt or sugar (commonly known as 
HFSS foods), or specific junk food categories included in Table 1. Polices were also included if they 
restricted marketing methods for all foods except healthy or “better-for-you” products [54]. Policies that 
addressed food marketing or marketing to children generally were included if they impacted junk food 
marketing in a significant way. Significance was assigned if the policy imposed audience restrictions or 
restrictions on marketing techniques.  
Inclusion Criteria 2. Application to television marketing was established as a minimum as it is 
traditionally the most popular form of advertising food and beverages, and is the most commonly 
regulated medium amongst food marketing regulations [55].  
Inclusion Criteria 3. Policies that only applied to a region within a country (i.e., the Quebec 
Consumer Protection Act) were not included. Policies that affected global regions, such as the European 
Union and Gulf Cooperation Council, were included for all countries under that region.  
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Inclusion Criteria 4. EuroMonitor packaged foods sales data ranged from 2002 – 2021, with 2016 as 
the last year of real, non-projected data. Due to this limitation, policies must have been enacted on 
January 1, 2003 or later, and before December 31, 2014, leaving two years for policy impact to be 
observed.  
Policies were excluded from analysis based on the following exclusion criteria:  
1. Applies exclusively to soft drinks and/or energy drinks 
2. Applies exclusively to non-television mediums or environments 
3. Implemented before January 1, 2003 or on December 31, 2014 or later.  
Exclusion Criteria 1. Policies specific to soft drinks or energy drinks were not included for reasons 
stated earlier, and because they would likely affect only one EuroMonitor category, while general junk 
food marketing policies could potentially affect a range of food categories.  
Exclusion Criteria 2 and 3. As noted in inclusion criteria 2 and 4.   
Countries with one or more junk food broadcast marketing policy satisfying inclusion and exclusion 
criteria will be referred to as “policy countries.” Countries absent of any such policy will be referred to as 
“non-policy countries.” 
 
Policy Data 
The following materials (Table 2) were used to identify and characterize junk food broadcast marketing 
policies. 
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Table 2. Sources for Policy Data Collection. 
 
 
Author 
 
 
Title 
 
Year 
Published 
 
 
Link Source 
Hawkes, Lobstein Regulating the commercial promotion of 
food to children: A survey of actions 
worldwide 
2011 doi: 10.3109/17477166.2010.486836 
WHO-Europe Marketing of foods high in fat, salt and 
sugar to children: Update 2012-2013 
2013 http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_
file/0019/191125/e96859.pdf  
European Advertising 
Standards Alliance 
Information request on food advertising 2014 http://www.easa-
alliance.org/sites/default/files/2014_Food%
20advertising.pdf  
International Food and 
Beverage Alliance 
Voluntary Regional and National Pledge 
Programmes 
NA https://ifballiance.org/our-
commitments/responsible-marketing-
advertising-to-children/  
World Cancer 
Research Fund 
International 
Nourishing framework: Restrict food 
advertising and other forms of 
commercial promotion 
2016 http://www.wcrf.org/sites/default/files/Restr
ict-advertising.pdf  
International Food and 
Beverage Alliance 
Food and beverage marketing to children: 
The global regulatory agenda 
2015 https://ifballiance.org/?s=global+map+and+
overview+of+marketing+restrictions  
UNICEF, DLA Piper Advertising and marketing to children: 
Global report 
2016 https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Ins
ights/Publications/2016/12/3169756_UNIC
EF_Advertising_To_Children_Update_V8.
pdf  
European Commission, 
Directorate-General 
for Health and 
Consumers, WHO-
Europe 
Current implementation status of the 
strategy for Europe on nutrition, 
overweight and obesity related 
health issues 
2010 http://ec.europa.eu/health//sites/health/files/
nutrition_physical_activity/docs/implement
ation_report_a6_en.pdf  
World Obesity 
Federation 
Policies on marketing food and beverages 
to children 
2010 http://www.worldobesity.org/what-we-
do/policy-prevention/projects/marketing-
children/policy-map/  
UConn Rudd Center 
for Food Policy and 
Obesity 
Pledges on food marketing to children 2014 http://pledges.uconnruddcenter.org/search.a
spx  
 
Policy data were confirmed by sourcing the original policy document, when available, through 
industry and government websites, publications and news articles. After exhausting the above resources, 
if no policy information was found on a country relevant to junk food broadcast marketing, it was 
assumed the said country had no relevant policy. 
 
Characterization of Policies  
Countries were characterized across ten categories (Table 3) under two domains: policy type and 
implementation. This design was modeled after the template by Hawkes and Lobstein [32]. The United 
Kingdom CAP Code [51] and the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland’s Children’s Commercial 
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Communication Code [56] were used to identify key marketing technique restrictions for characterization. 
WHO recommendations [43] and recommendations by Consumers International (CI) and International 
Association for the Study of Obesity (IASO) [57] were used to establish measures for audience 
restrictions. 
Policy was assessed using the inclusion and exclusion criteria above. When a country had 
multiple policies, the maximum subcategory was entered for each category except marketing techniques 
and media, which are continuous in nature. Countries were assigned a score of 0 for each category when a 
junk food broadcast marketing policy was not identified.  
 
Table 3. Characterization of Policies. 
 
Domain 
 
Categories 
 
Subcategories 
Policy type Policy No 
Yes 
Regulatory 
type 
Self-regulation 
Statutory regulation 
Audience 
restrictions 
Multi-step approach 
Comprehensive approach 
Nutrition 
Criteria 
No  
Guidance 
Standardized 
Implementation General 
method 
Guidance 
Restrictions 
Messaging 
Application Applies to all food marketing 
Applies specifically to junk food 
marketing 
Applies to all marketing to children 
Marketing 
techniques 
Licensed characters 
Equity brand characters 
Celebrities and/or sports stars 
Health and nutrition claims 
Sponsorship 
Product placement 
Promotional offers 
Media Television 
Radio 
Internet 
School 
Child age 
definitionsa 
None 
12 years and younger 
13 years and older 
Monitoring and 
Enforcement 
None 
Either 
Both 
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Self-regulation was assessed as policies formed and overseen by self-regulatory organizations 
and/or industry. Government regulations are policies regulating junk food broadcast marketing through 
regulations and statutes. In many cases, governments may write legislation encouraging or mandating that 
self-regulatory organizations or industry players introduce junk food broadcast marketing policies. 
Encouragement was not considered to be government regulation, however, government mandates for such 
policies were included as government regulation. For example, in 2011 the Spanish government published 
the Food Security and Nutrition Act which mandated that self-regulatory codes extend to minors 15 years 
and under, otherwise the government would enact its own regulations.  
Audience restrictions refer to the method a policy used to define which audiences can and cannot 
be advertised to. Multi-step approaches encompass the strategies which restrict advertisements based on 
specified time slots or the percentage of children making up an audience, or policies may cap the percent 
of advertising space that junk foods can fill. Comprehensive approaches are those that ban junk food 
advertising entirely to a specific audience across specific mediums. 
Nutrition criteria identified as guidance are those which ask industries to develop individual 
guidelines based on accepted scientific evidence or dietary guidelines. Standardized nutrition criteria 
include those policies that explicitly define at baseline which foods may or may not be advertised, 
applicable uniformly across all industry players.  
General method refers to whether a policy is suggestive in nature, which usually takes on the 
form of ethical guidelines, or restrictive, in which policies prohibit specific methods of marketing, 
marketing to specified audiences, or marketing of specific products [32]. Additionally, countries were 
coded for whether they required messaging to accompany junk food advertisements in the form of healthy 
messaging or warning labels. Hawkes and Lobstein’s definitions of guidance, restrictions and messaging 
were used to classify policies into either category [32]. For example, the ICC Framework for Responsible 
Food and Beverage Communication states that while the use of fantasy is appropriate for child-directed 
marketing, “care should be taken not to exploit a child’s imagination in a way that could mislead him/her 
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about the nutritional benefits of the product involved” [58]. Codes written in this form give the 
impression of regulation, but in actuality do not impose any restriction on marketing capability.  
Child age definitions are a common method of defining which audiences a policy applies to. For 
measurement purposes, the ages for which a policy applied was recorded and grouped into the 
subcategories shown in Table 3.  
Countries that specified methods within their policy document(s) for carrying out monitoring or 
enforcement measures were identified. Monitoring includes methods such as the use of a monitoring 
body, a complaints procedure, or clearance of applicable advertisements prior to airing. Enforcement 
includes a range of sanctions for non-compliance, including expulsion of a company from a membership 
organization, adverse publicity, withdrawal of advertisements, and fines, among others. 
The category “Application” was not further pursued as 47 out of 49 policy countries had a policy 
that satisfied “applies specifically to junk food marketing.” Under category “General Method,” 47 out of 
49 countries had a policy restrictive in nature and one country had a policy only utilizing guidance. 
Therefore “general method” was condensed to compare countries with policies containing only guidance 
and/or restrictions versus those which mandated messaging. “Marketing techniques” and “Media” were 
coded as continuous variables ranging from 0 to 7 and 0 to 4 respectively. All categories underwent 
typical data cleaning.   
 
Statistical Analysis 
IBM SPSS Statistics 24 was used to perform a series of repeated measures ANOVA (significance level ≤ 
0.05) for each category under Table 3. Two samples were used based on domain: policy type variables 
were analyzed for policy and non-policy countries; implementation variables were analyzed for policy 
countries only. Policy type and implementation variables were adjusted with the following covariates: the 
2015 Human Development Index [59] was used to adjust for development status and socioeconomic 
variables across countries, including life expectancy, education and gross national income per capita. 
Development level of a country is likely to be associated with food culture, purchasing habits and obesity 
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prevalence [60]. The 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index [61] was used to adjust for the ability of a 
country to fully implement and enforce a policy. Since policies measured in this study are age-specific, 
variables were adjusted for the 2016 median age of each country’s population [62]. Lastly, only 
implementation variables were adjusted for year of implementation of the policy in order to adjust for 
variable effect size due to time passed since implementation. Policy type variables were not adjusted for 
year of implementation as this sample included policy and non-policy countries. 
Results 
From the original EuroMonitor sample, 49 countries of the 79 had at least one junk food broadcast 
marketing policy that fit the inclusion criteria. These countries were identified as policy countries, while 
the remaining 30 countries were identified as non-policy countries. Policy countries had between one to 
four policies in place that met inclusion criteria.  
  
Region and development 
Countries in the study came from all regions of the world, including Asia (15 countries), Australia (2), 
Eastern Europe (18), Latin America (13), Africa (12), North America (2), and Western Europe (17), as 
defined by EuroMonitor. Countries with policies included all Western Europe and North American 
countries, most of Eastern Europe (13), half of Australian (1) and Asian (7) countries and less than half of 
Latin American (5) and African (4) countries. 
Based on the Human Development Index (HDI), countries in the EuroMonitor inventory 
represented varying levels of human development: low (5%), medium (13%), high (37%) and very high 
(46%). No very low human development nations are included. Policy countries had medium (8%), high 
(29%) and very high (63%) levels of human development. Policy countries did not include countries from 
low human development status. Policy and non-policy countries were significantly different in HDI (p < 
0.001) with a mean HDI of 0.73 for non-policy countries and 0.84 for policy countries.  
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Regulatory type 
In terms of regulatory type, policies came in the form of statutory regulation or self-regulation. Self-
regulatory policies were generally developed by self-regulatory organizations or industry alliances in the 
form of pledges. From 2003 through the end of 2014, 16 countries had enacted one or more statutory 
policies (Table 4), and the remaining policy countries were covered by self-regulation. Pledges covered 
countries on a national or regional basis (i.e., European Union Pledge).  
  
Table 4. Sample Countries According to Regulatory Type 
 
Statutory regulation 
 
Self-regulation 
 
Non-policy countries 
Brazil 
Denmark 
Ecuador 
France 
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Norway 
Peru 
Serbia 
Slovenia 
South Korea 
Spaina 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Finland 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
India 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Netherlands 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
South Africa 
Swedenb 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
United Arab Emirates 
United States 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bolivia 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Cameroon 
China 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Egypt 
Georgia 
Guatemala 
Hong Kong, China 
Iran 
Israel 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Macedonia 
Morocco 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Tunisia 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
a Spain’s PAOS code is self-regulated, but government legislation has directed the language of the PAOS code by 
mandating specific restrictions be in place; b Swedish legislation banned child-directed advertising in 1996, but was not 
included under “statutory regulation” as the policy was implemented prior to study timeframe 
 
 
Characterization of policies  
Table 5 shows the characterization of policies by category. Seven countries undertook a comprehensive 
approach to audience restrictions by banning child-directed marketing of junk foods or all foods, or 
banning child-directed marketing as a whole. These countries include Indonesia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, 
Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Sweden and Quebec similarly undertook a comprehensive 
approach to audience restrictions, but these policies were implemented prior to the sample timeframe. The 
majority of countries used a multi-step approach for audience restrictions (42 countries), which came in 
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the form of marketing prohibitions during specific time slots, on certain television channels, or to 
audiences that had a minimum percent of child viewership.  
Eleven countries established standardized nutrition criteria that defined foods that could and 
could not be advertised, while 34 countries provided non-enforceable guidance on the food types that 
should be advertised.  Policies were applied to all marketing to children (Indonesia, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom), to all food marketing (11 countries), or specifically to junk 
food marketing (47 countries). Policy method was dominantly in the form of restrictions (47 policies), 
followed by guidance (22 policies) and mandated messaging (8 policies). Countries with messaging 
requirements include Slovenia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Turkey. 
Policy countries could be classified as having one or more applications or methods in the case that a 
country had more than one junk food marketing policy. 
Overall, 22 countries had restrictions of one to six marketing techniques, with Ireland as the only 
country to restrict six marketing techniques. Use of licensed characters and celebrities and/or sports stars 
were the most popular marketing techniques that were restricted (restricted in 15 and 14 policies 
respectively). Restriction of equity brand characters was not identified in any policy. Equity brand 
characters are characters developed for the purpose of promoting a product or service (i.e., Ronald 
McDonald). Licensed characters are borrowed equities whose original purpose is unassociated with 
promotion of the product or service (i.e., Dora the Explorer). For the purpose of analysis, if a policy 
restricted the use of “characters” generally, this was taken to mean licensed characters, but not equity 
brand characters. Thus while some laws through legal interpretation may indeed cover equity brand 
characters, this was not reflected in these data. Use of health claims was restricted in five policies, 
sponsorship in six policies, product placement in eight policies and promotional offers in nine policies.  
All policy countries had a junk food marketing policy that regulated television. Marketing in 
schools was the second most regulated media form (43 countries), followed by internet (42 countries) and 
radio marketing (30 countries). While the internet is covered by the majority of policy countries, this is 
mainly due to the European Union Pledge. Policies were most often applied to child-directed advertising, 
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for which the definition of children was capped at a specified age. Countries usually defined children as 
under 12 years of age (33 countries). Sixteen countries set the age limit for children above 12 years of 
age. France’s Public Health Act of 2004, which implemented healthy messaging to accompany junk food 
radio and television marketing, is applicable to all junk food commercials regardless of audience age.  
Thirty-four countries had specified methods for monitoring compliance. Methods included the 
use of a monitoring body, a complaints procedure, or clearance of applicable advertisements prior to 
airing. Twenty-eight countries specified sanctions for cases of non-compliance, which included the 
expulsion of a company from a membership organization, adverse publicity, withdrawal of 
advertisements, fines, and revoking of a broadcasting license. Twenty-seven countries had both 
monitoring and enforcement measures.  
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Table 5. Change in Total Junk Food Sales by Policy Type 
     
Total junk food sales, kg 
per capita (sd) 
  
Domain Categories Subcategories N 2002 2016       Δ (%) 
Policy type  
(n = 79) a 
Policy None 30 44.0 (31.6) 50.1 (36.9) + 6.1 (13.9) 
Yes 49 79.6 (44.4) 78.0 (40.3) - 1.6 (2.0) 
Regulatory 
type 
None 30 44.0 (31.6) 50.1 (36.9) + 6.1 (13.9) 
Self-regulation 33 78.1 (35.4) 79.4 (37.0) + 1.3 (1.7) 
Statutory regulation 16 82.7 (58.8) 75.3 (47.5) - 7.4 (8.9) 
Audience 
restrictions 
None 34 49.5 (35.4) 55.5 (40.0) + 6 (12.1) 
Multi-step approach 38 81.5 (45.0) 79.1 (40.0) - 2.4 (2.9) 
Comprehensive approach 7 62.6 (45.6) 62.1 (40.5) - 0.5 (0.8) 
Nutrition 
criteria 
None 34 48.8 (33.6) 54 (38.0) + 5.2 (10.7) 
Guidance 34 73.3 (39.0) 73.8 (38.7) + 0.5 (0.7) 
Standardized 11 97.5 (60.7) 89.1 (47.2) - 8.4 (8.6) 
        
Implementation 
(n = 49) 
Application None 0 -- --  -- 
All food marketing 11 -- --  -- 
Specific to junk food 
marketing 
47 -- --  -- 
All marketing to children 5 -- --  -- 
General 
method 
None 0 -- --  -- 
Guidance and/or restrictions 41 77.4 (41.1) 77.4 (39.0) 0 0 (0) 
Messaging 8 90.7 (60.7) 81.2 (49.3) - 9.5 (10.5) 
Marketing 
techniques 
None 27 78.1 (43.4) 77.2 (41.0) - 0.9 (1.2) 
1 restrictions 6 68.2 (46.7) 65.0 (44.5) - 3.2 (4.7) 
2 restrictions 6 100.2 (65.3) 98.8 (52.9) - 1.4 (1.4) 
3 restrictions 3 66.0 (32. 5) 72.2 (33.3) + 6.2 (9.4) 
4 restrictions 6 77.8 (34.8) 73.5 (29.5) - 4.3 (5.5) 
5 restrictions 0 -- --  -- 
6 restrictions 1 116.0 99.3 - 16.7 (14.4) 
Media None 0 -- --  -- 
1 media restriction 0 -- --  -- 
2 media restrictions 5 43.7 (50.2) 48.5 (55.5) + 4.8 (11.0) 
3 media restrictions 22 84.2 (40.6) 82.8 (37.7) - 1.4 (1.7) 
4 media restrictions 22 83.2 (45.1) 80.0 (38.3) - 3.2 (3.8) 
Child age 
definitions 
None 0 -- --  -- 
12 years and under 33 78.5 (48.7) 76.2 (43.2) - 2.3 (2.9) 
13 years or older 16 81.8 (35.1) 81.9 (34.4) + 0.1 (0.1) 
Monitoring 
and 
enforcement 
None 14 74.6 (34.9) 74.5 (36.0) - 0.1 (0.1) 
Either 8 80.0 (50.8) 82.6 (50.9) + 2.6 (3.3) 
Both 27 82. 1 (48.1) 78.5 (40.5) - 3.6 (4.4) 
a Non-policy countries (n = 30) were rated as “none” in policy type categories  
 
 
Changes in junk food sales over time 
Figure 1 illustrates the change in junk food sales over time for each independent variable. On average, 
policy countries saw a decrease (-2.0% on average) in junk food sales between 2002 and 2016, while 
countries which had not implemented policies observed an increase (+13.9%) in sales. By regulatory type, 
only countries that enacted statutory regulation saw a decrease (-8.9%) in sales, while countries with only 
self-regulatory policies saw an increase in sales (+1.7%). Analyses according to audience restrictions 
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showed that countries with either multi-step or comprehensive approaches had a decrease in sales (-2.9% 
and -0.8% respectively). Countries with nutrition criteria classified as guidance saw a slight increase in 
sales (+0.7%), while those with standardized nutrition criteria saw a decrease in sales (-8.4%).  
When looking at the general method of a policy, those utilizing only guidance or restrictions had 
no change in sales on average, while countries utilizing messaging had a 10.5% decrease in junk food 
sales. A decrease in sales was observed for countries with three or four media restrictions (-1.7% and -
3.8% respectively), while countries with only two media restrictions saw an increase in sales (11.0%). For 
policies that defined the maximum age of a child at 12 years or younger, a decrease in sales was observed 
(-2.9%), while policies that defined the maximum age of a child at 13 or above, there was a minimal 
increase in sales (+0.1%). In order to explore this further, child age definitions at age 13 or above were 
broken down into age 13-15, and 16 or above. Countries with a child age definition of 16 or above saw a 
decrease in sales similar to child age definitions at 12 or younger, while age 13-15 saw an increase in 
sales. Five of the six countries with age definitions between 13-15 had only self-regulation, while eight of 
the ten countries with age definitions 16 or above had statutory regulation, thus it is likely that regulatory 
type is influencing the data trend in this case. Countries with methods for both monitoring and 
enforcement saw a decrease in sales (-4.4%); those with only monitoring or enforcement saw an increase 
(+3.3%) and countries with neither had minimal change (-0.1%). Here again, the majority of countries (7 
out of 8) with only monitoring or enforcement had self-regulation only, which may explain why this 
group saw an increase in sales. For marketing techniques (Figure 2), only countries with three restrictions 
had an increase in sales (+9.4%), while the remainder experienced a decrease in sales, without a clear 
trend. Countries with three restrictions were majorly self-regulatory (two of three), while for countries 
with any other number of restrictions, at least half of the countries had statutory policies. Thus again it 
appears regulatory type is influencing the data.   
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Figure 1. Total Junk Food Sales over Time by Policy Type and Implementation Methoda  
 
 
 
 
  a n = 79 for policy, regulatory type, nutrition criteria, audience restrictions; n = 49 for monitoring & 
enforcement, media, child age definitions, general method 
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Figure 2. Percent Change in Junk Food Sales over Time by Number of Marketing Technique 
Restrictions.  
 
Before adjustment with covariates, presence of a policy, regulatory type, audience restrictions, 
nutrition criteria and general method were significantly associated with a change in junk food sales over 
time (Table 6). Note that regulatory type was also statistically significant when compared amongst only 
policy countries and adjusted for covariates (n = 49, p = 0.020). After initial adjustment, the above 
variables were still significant. After a second adjustment for the same covariates and regulatory type, 
audience restrictions, nutrition criteria and general method were non-significant. 
Marketing techniques, media, child age definitions and monitoring and enforcement were not 
found to be significant before or after adjustments. However, child age definitions showed trend 
association after adjustment for regulatory type (p = 0.061).  
Regulatory type proved to be a significant covariate for the following models: audience 
restrictions, marketing techniques, media, and child age definitions. For the remaining variables, 
regulatory type had a trend association as a covariate: nutrition criteria (p = 0.082), general method (p = 
0.072), and monitoring and enforcement (p = 0.057).  
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Table 6. Association of Policy Type by Change in Junk Food Sales 
  
 
Unadjusted 
 
 
Adjusteda 
  
Adjusted + regulatory 
typeb 
Domain Categories F df sig  F df sig  F df sig 
Policy type  
(n = 79) 
Policy 7.179 1,77 0.009  6.427 1,74 0.013  -- -- -- 
Regulatory type 6.659 2,74 0.002  5.839 2,73 0.004  -- -- -- 
Audience 
restrictions 
4.336 2,76 0.016  3.910 2,73 0.024  1.396 2,72 0.254 
Nutrition criteria 5.433 2,76 0.006  5.127 2,73 0.008  1.052 2,72 0.355 
             
Implementation 
(n = 49) 
General method 4.704 1,47 0.035  3.944 1,43 0.053  1.650 1,42 0.206 
Marketing 
techniquesc 
0.535 1,47 0.468  0.934 1,43 0.339  0.017 1,42 0.896 
Mediac 1.611 1,47 0.211  1.521 1,43 0.224  0.514 1,42 0.514 
Child age 
definitions 
0.432 1,47 0.514  0.319 1,43 0.575  3.692 1,42 0.061 
Monitoring  and 
enforcement 
1.001 2,46 0.375  0.982 2,42 0.383  0.157 2,41 0.856 
a Adjusted for HDI, corruption index, and median age of country; b Policy type variables adjusted for HDI, corruption index, 
median age of country, and regulatory type (none, statutory, self-regulatory); implementation variables adjusted for above and 
year of implementation; c inputted as continuous variables 
 
Discussion 
H1/H2: Policy countries saw a decrease in junk food sales  
It was hypothesized that countries that initiated one or more junk food broadcast marketing policies 
would experience a decrease in junk food sales, which would be greater than countries that did not 
implement said policies. For policy countries, the present study observed a decrease in mean total junk 
food sales between 2002 and 2016, while non-policy countries saw an average increase in sales. Changes 
in total junk food sales over time in policy countries were significantly different from non-policy 
countries. Decreased sales in policy countries are likely due to a reduction in junk food advertisements, 
which were targeted in these policies. 
Indeed, studies have shown that junk food broadcast marketing policies can affect a decrease in 
junk food marketing. In Brazil, just a year after the government’s implementation of Conanda Resolution 
163, Britto, Viebig and Morimoto found that food and drink advertisements directed to children made up 
only 5.6% of TV ads observed [63]. In contrast, studies before the ban identified up to four times as many 
food and drink commercials [64,65 , 66]. Thus, the presence of broadcast marketing restrictions for junk 
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food products may predict a decrease in junk food advertisements, which would hypothetically be 
followed by decreased sales and consumption of junk food products.  
 
H3: Statutory policies were associated with a decrease in junk food sales  
The present study hypothesized that countries with statutory junk food broadcast marketing policies 
would experience greater decreases in junk food sales compared to self-regulatory policies. Changes in 
junk food sales over time were significantly different between regulated and nonregulated policies. Only 
countries with statutory regulation saw an average decrease in junk food sales, while countries with only 
self-regulation saw an increase in sales on average. This is most likely a reflection of the ineffectiveness 
of self-regulatory efforts, as discussed below.  
In Australia, where three separate self-regulatory codes were implemented in 2009 to restrict junk 
food marketing, studies found that little to no progress had been made in reducing children’s exposure to 
food advertising. One group found that in 2011, two years after policy implementation, the rate of “non-
core” food commercials were not significantly different from 2006 [67]. In fact, the rate of fast food 
commercials were significantly higher (1.8 per hour in 2010 compared to 1.1 per hour in 2006). While 
non-core foods took up less advertising space as a whole in 2010 compared to 2009, the frequency of 
non-core food commercials during peak children viewing times did not change [68].  
Spain has relied on self-regulation through its PAOS Code. The code was strengthened in 2012 
when the government required that the PAOS code regulate internet advertising for child audiences under 
15. Despite government interaction with self-regulatory forces, Spain’s self-regulation has had minimal 
impact. A study found that between 2007 and 2013 there was a marginal decrease in food advertising of 
non-core foods (56% in 2007 to 52.2% in 2013), however, non-core foods still made up the majority of 
foods advertised to children on TV [69]. 
As discussed previously, government-led initiatives to reduce marketing to children have been 
able to achieve high compliance rates that result in a significant reduction in junk food advertisements. In 
contrast, self-regulatory efforts often report high compliance rates, yet countries with only self-regulatory 
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policies in place saw increases in junk food sales. This is likely a result of lenient policies influenced by 
corporate agendas. For instance, in 2016 the European Union Pledge reported a compliance rate of 98.7% 
for television, 95% for company brand websites, and an 83% reduction in children exposure to marketing 
for products that do not fit the pledge’s standardized nutrition criteria [70]. However, nutrition criteria by 
the European Union Pledge still allow for advertising of savory snacks up to 900mg sodium / 100g, sweet 
snacks (i.e., cereal bars, biscuits, cakes) up to 35g total sugars / 100g, and breakfast cereals up to 30g total 
sugars / 100g [19]. Many of the products that meet the pledge’s nutrition limits would not be allowed for 
advertising in the United Kingdom according to the United Kingdom nutrition profiling model [18]. 
Despite the pledge’s leniency, half of children’s breakfast cereals in European countries will not meet the 
30g sugar limit [19]. 
 
H4: Strictness of policies had limited association with junk food sales  
It was hypothesized that stricter junk food broadcast marketing policies would experience a greater 
decrease in junk food sales compared to less strict policies. After adjustment with covariates including 
regulatory type, no policy type or implementation variables, besides presence and regulatory type, were 
found to be significant. However, without adjustment, audience restrictions, nutrition criteria and general 
method predicted significant differences in the change of junk food sales over time. 
Those countries that imposed audience restrictions demonstrated that both multi-step and 
comprehensive approaches saw a decrease in junk food sales, compared to all other countries which saw a 
general increase in sales. Only countries with standardized nutrition criteria saw a decrease in sales, while 
all others, including countries utilizing only guidance for nutrition criteria, saw an increase. With respect 
to general method, there was a large difference between countries that mandated healthy messaging 
and/or warning messages with junk food advertisements versus those that utilized only guidance or 
restrictions. Countries with mandated messaging saw a sales decrease of 10.5%, while other countries saw 
no change.  
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While these policy types are not significant after adjustment for regulatory type, it must be noted 
that more stringent characteristics are inherently linked to statutory legislation. For instance, eight out of 
16 countries with statutory policies established standardized nutrition criteria, compared to only three out 
of 33 countries (9%) with only self-regulation. With respect to audience restrictions, no self-regulatory 
policy took on a comprehensive approach, while seven countries (44%) with statutory regulation did. 
Only two countries taking a self-regulation approach (6%) implemented messaging, while six countries 
with statutory regulations (38%) did. Therefore, because stricter policy characteristics are much more 
likely to belong to statutory policies, in combination with the limited number of statutory policies 
available for study, adjusting for regulatory type appears to be washing out the significance of these 
measured characteristics. Additionally, it appears that regulatory type was influencing the data trend for 
child age definitions, monitoring and enforcement, and marketing techniques. Given a larger sample of 
statutory policies to analyze, it is possible these variables may be statistically significant with adjustment 
for regulatory type.  
 
Self-regulation remains the dominant type of policy 
The majority of industry pledges surveyed in this study originated from IFBA. Due to the European 
Union and Gulf Cooperation Council regional pledges and worldwide infiltration of IFBA national 
pledges, most policy countries (90%) had at least one industry pledge in place. All surveyed industry 
pledges were written and implemented after 2003, with the first industry junk food marketing pledges 
initiated in 2006. Thus it can be assumed that all industry pledges through the end of 2014 were captured 
in the study timeframe for this analysis. Since Hawkes and Lobstein’s 2011 analysis [32], more countries 
have implemented statutory regulations on food marketing to children.  
 
Limitations 
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This study has many limitations. The limited sample size of countries made it difficult to establish 
differences across subcategories. A small sample size also makes it difficult to generalize these findings 
to all countries in the world. Additionally, because EuroMonitor reported packaged food sales data for 
only 80 countries starting from 2002, not all policies (i.e., Sweden’s 1996 General Marketing Act) were 
available for analysis under study conditions.  
Policy data were not confirmed with country informants, therefore it is not certain whether the 
information is correct nor whether policies are fully implemented and/or actively enforced. Additionally, 
it is possible that some non-policy countries had junk food marketing policies in place that were not 
measured.  
Countries with policies were disproportionately more likely than countries without such 
regulations to be from Europe and North America and those of very high development status. In addition 
to a lack of junk food marketing policies, less developed countries tend to have younger populations [71]. 
Tobacco companies have been widely criticized for purposefully targeting youth populations, most 
iconically through the use of cartoon character Joe Camel, marketing techniques that the food industry has 
adopted today [40]. The large youth populations of developing nations make them a ripe target for junk 
food sales, especially as food corporations are increasingly criticized and regulated in wealthier states. 
Additionally, while countries without policies saw an increase in junk food sales over time in this study, 
they also had lower junk food sales compared to countries regulating junk foods in any given year. Thus 
the increase in junk food sales in non-policy countries may be partially explained by the growing market 
of and move of food corporations into the less developed world.  
Regional voluntary pledges obscure the lines between policy and non-policy countries. In this 
study regional industry pledges were coded as a self-regulatory policy for all countries in the region. The 
presence of regional industry pledges may have no relation to a government’s intent to establish statutory 
policies or encourage self-regulation.  Thus it can be imagined that without government intent to establish 
or encourage junk food marketing policies, industry pledges in these countries would have minimal 
oversight and impact.  
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Monitoring and enforcement methods were defined broadly, which decreased the ability to detect 
an effect. Self-regulatory policies tended towards less stringent enforcement methods such as expulsion 
from voluntary alliances, withdrawal of advertisements or citation of non-compliant cases on their 
website. Government policies often cited the revocation of advertising licenses or punishment by fines 
and imprisonment. The vast differences in enforcement methods under self-regulatory and government 
forces may impact corporate incentive to comply, therefore diminishing the ability to detect the impact of 
enforcement on junk food sales.  
Advertising via new media (i.e., online, mobile devices) is on the rise, poorly regulated and often 
not addressed in junk food marketing policies. The FTC reported that food companies spent 50% more 
between 2006 and 2009 to reach American children through new media [23]. For this reason, the 
successful implementation of junk food marketing policies may not actually reduce youth exposure to 
junk food advertisements if new media are not properly regulated.  
Outside of junk food marketing policies, a number of countries have initiated efforts to control 
obesity through health education and public awareness campaigns, taxation of unhealthy foods and 
beverages, nutritional labelling, and increased access to healthy foods [34]. Thus, it is likely this study is 
detecting the impact of multiple obesity control policies.  
Likewise, broadcast advertising represents only one form of influence over food purchases. 
Ofcom demonstrated the “web of causality” in which children’s food preferences are impacted by family 
habits and demographics, school characteristics and policies, social pressures, media literacy and 
exposure to advertising [9]. While TV advertising has been shown to have direct and indirect effects on 
preferences and purchases, the absolute size of the effect has yet to be determined. In the context of the 
“web of causality,” it is reasonable as to why TV advertising has only a modest direct effect, further 
complicating our ability to correlate marketing policies and sales. However, while difficult to measure, it 
is likely that the indirect effects of advertising influence the aforementioned factors, especially social 
pressures and family habits, thus increasing the overall impact of TV advertising.  
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It must also be noted that national efforts to restrict or ban junk food advertising to children are 
complicated by cross-border marketing. For example, Sweden’s 1996 ban on child-targeted television and 
radio advertising was challenged by the European Court of Justice that ruled that the policy restrained 
trade and discriminated against transnational broadcasters [72]. This allowed for the presence of child-
targeted advertising from international broadcasters despite Swedish law. Thus regardless of the strength 
of a nation’s policy, restrictions can appear to be ineffective if cross-border marketing is not addressed. In 
this survey of junk food marketing policies, only Ecuador’s 2013 Law on Communications restricted 
foreign advertisements. Canada and Ireland’s junk food marketing policies both specified that they were 
not to be applied to foreign media.  
In addition to junk food sales, this study originally aimed to investigate the correlation of policy 
implementation with changes in healthy food sales and childhood overweight/obesity trends. 
Unfortunately, EuroMonitor has limited data available for healthy food sales such as fruits and 
vegetables. Additionally, childhood overweight/obesity data were not available in a consistent format for 
all countries studied. In future research, the use of such data could possibly validate the findings 
expressed here. 
 
Future research and recommendations 
In light of the present study’s findings, the authors recommend those countries that have adopted statutory 
or self-regulatory policies study food sales and health data within their country before and after 
implementation. Food sales data allows countries to observe policy impact and the role of junk food 
advertising in their population’s decision-making. Health data, especially childhood and adult 
overweight/obesity and type II diabetes, will allow countries to observe whether policy implementation 
has a large enough impact to affect health outcomes. Countries can also be studied individually using a 
combination of outcome data such as junk food advertisements, junk food sales and health outcome 
measures in order to determine overall impact of a particular policy. 
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Additionally, governments should be wary of compliance rate reports. As mentioned previously, 
self-regulatory policies often report near-perfect rates of compliance likely due to policy leniency. High 
rates of compliance can mask the actual impact of a policy on outcomes such as number of 
advertisements, shopping and eating behaviors, and disease. To avoid this, countries should focus on 
reductions in junk food advertisements measured using unbiased, standardized nutritional criteria in 
addition to the measurement of food sales and health data.  
Conclusion 
This study utilizes a novel approach to evaluate the effectiveness of junk food marketing policies by 
measuring changes in junk food sales in an ecological study design. Countries with junk food marketing 
policies saw a decrease in junk food sales after implementation, while those without said policies saw an 
increase in sales. Countries with statutory policies saw a decrease in junk food sales, while those with 
only self-regulation saw an increase. Comprehensive audience restrictions, standardized nutrition criteria 
and mandated messaging were policy characteristics significantly associated with a decrease in junk food 
sales, but no effect was observed after adjustment for regulatory type.  
While this study suggests junk food marketing policies, specifically statutory policies, are 
associated with a decrease in junk food sales, policy implementation may not be the sole cause for the 
change in sales observed. However, in the context of previously cited studies which unveil how marketing 
techniques influence children to consume and prefer unhealthy foods, and the success of statutory policies 
in reducing child exposure to junk food marketing, there is great reason for governments to restrict child-
directed marketing of junk foods.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Policies Studied 
 Country 
Regulatory 
typea Policy studied 
Countries 
with 
statutory 
regulation 
Brazil G 
S 
Conanda Resolution No. 163  
Brazil Public Commitment on Food and Beverage Advertising to Children 
Denmarkb G 
S 
S 
Executive Order No. 801 of 21 June 2013 on Radio and Television Advertising 
Forum of Responsible Food Marketing Communication 
Consumer Ombudsman 
Ecuador G National Assembly of Ecuador Law on Communications 
Franceb G 
S 
Public Health Act of 2004 
Autorité de Régulation Professionelle de la Publicité, Food Behaviors Code 
Indonesia G 
S 
Regulation of the Ministry of Health No. 1787 of 2010 
Indonesian Advertising Code of Ethics 
Irelandb G 
S 
Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, Children’s Commercial Communications Code 
Code of Standards for Advertising, Promotional and Direct Marketing in Ireland 
Malaysia G 
S 
National Plan of Action for Nutrition 
Malaysian Food and Beverage Industry’s “Responsible Advertising to Children” 
Initiative (The Malaysia Pledge) 
Mexico G 
S 
National Strategy for Prevention and Control of Overweight, Obesity and Diabetes 
Mexico Marketing to Children Pledge 
Norway G 
 
S 
Broadcasting Act No. 127 of 1992 (Chapter 3.1) in conjunction with Broadcasting 
Regulation No. 153 of 1997 (Section 3.6) 
Code for Marketing of Food and Drink Aimed at Children 
Peru G 
S 
Promoting Healthy Eating for Children and Adolescents Law No. 30021 
Peruvian Advertising Commitment 
Serbia G The Law on Advertising 
Sloveniab G 
S 
Audiovisual Media Services Act (ZAvMS) 
Slovenian Advertising Chamber Code 
South Korea G Special Act on the Safety Management of Children’s Dietary Life, Article 10 
Korea Federation of Advertising Associations, Code of Advertising Ethics 
Spain G Food Safety and Nutrition Act, Law 17/2011 in conjunction with  
PAOS (Publicidad, Actividad, Obesidad y Salud) Code 
Turkey G 
 
S 
Law No. 6112 ‘Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and 
their Media Services’ (RTUK Law) in conjunction with RTUK Regulation No. 
28103 
The Turkey Pledge 
United 
Kingdomb 
G Code of Broadcast Advertising (BCAP) in conjunction with Code of Non-Broadcast 
Advertising and Direct and Promotional Marketing (CAP) 
Countries 
with only 
self-
regulation 
Australia S 
 
S 
 
S 
Australian Food and Grocery Council Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative 
(RCMI) 
Quick Service Restaurant Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to 
Children (QSRI) 
Australian Association of National Advertisers Food and Beverage Advertising and 
Marketing Communications Code 
Austriab S Code of Conduct for the Austrian Radio Broadcasting Organizers 
Belgiumb S The Belgium Pledge 
Bulgariab S Framework for Responsible Commercial Communication of Food and Drinks 
Canada S 
 
S 
Advertising Standards Canada, the Broadcast Code for Advertising to Children 
Canadian Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative (CAI) 
Chile S Chilean Code of Advertising Ethics  
Colombia S Columbian Code of Advertising Self-Regulation (CCAS) 
Croatiab S European Union Pledge only 
Czech 
Republicb 
S Czech Advertising Standards Council Code of Advertising Practice 
Estoniab S European Union Pledge only 
Finlandb S 
 
Finnish Advertising Council (Maiononnan eettinen neuvosto) applies ICC Code 
Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority Consumer Ombudsman Guidelines 
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S 
Germanyb S German Standards Advertising Council (Deutscher Werberat) Code of Conduct on 
Commercial Communications for Foods and Beverages 
Greeceb S European Union Pledge only 
Hungaryb S The Hungarian Advertising Code of Ethics, Article 18 
India S The India Pledge 
Italyb S European Union Pledge only 
Latviab S European Union Pledge only 
Lithuaniab S European Union Pledge only 
Netherlandsb S The Dutch Advertising Code, Advertising Code for Food Products 
Philippines S Philippines Responsible Advertising to Children Initiative 
Polandb S Federation of Food Producers Code on Advertising Food to Children 
Portugalb S Portuguese Food Industry and Pledge on Diet, Physical Activity and Health: 
Advertising and Marketing Directed to Children 
Romaniab S Romanian Advertising Council 
Russia S The Russian Pledge ‘On Limitations on Advertising to Children’ 
Saudi 
Arabiac 
S Gulf Cooperation Council Pledge only 
Singapore S Singapore Responsible Advertising to Children Pledge 
Slovakiab S European Union Pledge only 
South Africa S 
 
S 
Advertising Standards Authority of South Africa (ASASA) Code of Advertising 
Practice, Appendix J 
The South African Pledge 
Swedenb S European Union Pledge only  
General Marketing Act (1996) banned advertising targeting children under 12 on 
radio and television; this was not included in the present study due to its 
implementation prior to the study timeframe 
Switzerland S The Switzerland Pledge 
Thailand S Thailand Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative (Thai Pledge) 
United Arab 
Emiratesc 
S Gulf Cooperation Council Pledge only 
United States S Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative 
a G = statutory policy, S = self-regulatory policy;  b European Union Pledge; c Gulf Cooperation Council Pledge 
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Appendix B 
CFBAI and European Union Pledge Member Companies 
 
  
CFBAI Member Companies 
American Licorice Company 
Burger King Corporation 
Campbell Soup Company 
The Coca-Cola Company 
ConAgra Foods, Inc. 
The Dannon Company 
Ferrero USA, Inc. 
General Mills, Inc. 
The Hershey Company 
Kellogg Company 
The Kraft Heinz Company 
Mars, Inc.  
McDonald’s USA, LLC 
Mondelēz Global, LLC 
Nestlé USA 
PepsiCo, Inc. 
Post Foods, LLC 
Unilever United States 
 
 
 
 
 
European Union Member Companies 
Bel Group 
Burger King 
Coca-Cola 
Danone 
European Snacks Association 
Amica Chips 
ICA Foods 
Intersnack (including Estrella Maarud) 
KiMs (owned by Orkla Confectionery and 
Snacks) 
Lorenz Snack-World 
Unichips – San Carlo 
Zweifel Pomy-Chips 
Ferrero 
General Mills 
Kellogg’s 
Mars 
McDonalds Europe 
Mondelēz 
Nestlé 
PepsiCo 
Royal FrieslandCampina 
Unilever 
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